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Let us come to praise Internet freedom, and to bury it. 
 Few would dispute the value of the concept of an open, 
interconnected Internet that facilitates the spread of information and 
ideas across borders while safeguarding civil liberties. As the 
environment surrounding the expansion and governance of the 
Internet evolves, however, it is useful to examine what particular value 
this term brings to the conversation, particularly from the standpoint 
of U.S. foreign policy discourse. 
Full disclosure: I have used the term “Internet freedom” in many a 
panel discussion. It has proven useful shorthand, particularly within 
U.S.-centric circles, for “all of the good stuff, none of the bad stuff.”  
And, yet, partly because the term is deliberately fuzzy while the issues 
involved are complex, it seems more closely affiliated with an earlier 
time when the idea of a “Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace” seemed relevant.  As the next billion users come online, 
the majority from developing countries, it may be time to drop this 
ambiguity in favor of focusing on specific concepts that will better 
preserve what has come to be a crucial global resource.  
 This may be seen as quibbling over semantics, but framing does 
matter. Simplified terms can often beget simplified solutions. In 
particular, the term “Internet freedom” has historically pointed 
toward a reductive policy path: Leave everything alone, except for the 
deployment of tools that foster “Internet freedom,” i.e., anti-
censorship technology. Moreover, the cover created by the strategic 
ambiguity of the term allows the U.S., which has long championed the 
concept and has spearheaded numerous related initiatives, to gloss 
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over troublesome issues such as the thorny nexus between national 
security, surveillance, strong encryption, civil liberties, and so on.  
 Internet freedom, however, is much more than just the specific 
technological tools that combat censorship and surveillance. 
Sustaining the complex, interdependent ecosystem that enables the 
free exchange of ideas requires careful thought about infrastructure, 
policies, and enabling environment, including basic political 
freedoms.  This ecosystem can certainly be affected by multilateral or 
multi-stakeholder action (where much rhetoric about Internet 
freedom abounds), but is primarily driven at the national level in the 
countries where user growth is expanding.  “Internet freedom,” then, 
would benefit from more specifics, both at the level of policy rhetoric 
among those that support it and in the assistance policies that flow 
from it.  Moreover, its supporters (chief among these being U.S. 
policymakers) must not shy away from a public global airing of the 
tough discussions and, yes, tradeoffs inherent in protecting and 
preserving an Internet that underpins the free exchange of ideas. This 
would actually bolster the United States’ credibility and allow it to 
advocate more effectively. 
DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS 
 The term “Internet freedom” has been bandied around in a U.S. 
foreign policy context since at least the early 2000s, when Internet 
access around the world really began to take off, including in a 
number of authoritarian regimes that restricted the free flow of 
information. Efforts to address this issue typically employed language 
such as that found in a bill introduced in the 108th U.S. Congress in 
2003. H.R. 48 was known as the “Global Internet Freedom Act,” 
designed to “develop and deploy technologies to defeat Internet 
jamming and censorship.”2 
 By 2010, while access, use, and regulation of the Internet had 
evolved considerably in both democratic and non-democratic states, 
the rhetoric had not budged much. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton’s groundbreaking “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” delivered 
at the Newseum in Washington D.C. in 2010, highlighted the 
increasing importance of online freedom of expression to U.S. 
democracy promotion policies. In her speech, in addition to noting 
that Internet freedom would be included as a component in the first 
1 H.R. 48, 108th Cong. (2003), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr48/text. 
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resolution introduced by the U.S. after it returned to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council, she explained that: 
We are also supporting the development of new tools 
that enable citizens to exercise their rights of free 
expression by circumventing politically motivated 
censorship. We are providing funds to groups around 
the world to make sure that those tools get to the 
people who need them in local languages, and with the 
training they need to access the internet safely. The 
United States has been assisting in these efforts for 
some time, with a focus on implementing these 
programs as efficiently and effectively as possible. Both 
the American people and nations that censor the 
internet should understand that our government is 
committed to helping promote internet freedom.3 
 In the meantime, various other groups attempted to carve out a 
more specific definition for the term. This was usually accomplished 
most easily by defining a negative space (i.e., this is what Internet 
freedom is not).  Particularly in the mainstream press, Internet 
freedom was understood, without any accompanying definition, to be 
“under attack” in China, North Korea, and in other (usually extreme) 
cases where Internet use was blocked or censored. Yet, news about 
some of the most interesting and vexing online expression questions 
were typically not treated as “Internet freedom” stories.  For instance: 
Should platforms for user-generated content be held liable for user 
speech? Should private companies use terms of service to restrict 
expression? For the most part, conventional wisdom seemed content 
to delineate Internet freedom along the lines of Justice Potter 
Stewart’s famed definition of pornography: “I know it when I see it.”3 
 Freedom House took a significant step toward defining metrics in 
establishing its “Freedom on the Net” report (published annually since 
2011), laying out three broad categories against which countries would 
be defined as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free,” following its standard 
methodology and terminology. These categories currently include 
2 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Remarks on 
Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.   
3 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
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obstacles to access (both infrastructural and economic, and 
encompassing issues such as legal and regulatory control over access 
providers), limits on content (including filtering, blocking, and 
diversity of online content), and violations of user rights (including 
legal protections/restrictions on activity, surveillance, and privacy).4 
While some have critiqued Freedom House’s methodology in its 
various indices, the Freedom on the Net report remains the most 
comprehensive attempt to define metrics on a global scale, against 
which individual countries (including the U.S. and other western 
industrialized democracies) can be measured.5 
 Other initiatives, rather than just measuring aspects of Internet 
freedom, set out to establish self-defined global norms, particularly 
during 2011 and 2012. For instance, the OECD’s “Principles for 
Internet Policy Making,” while not explicitly tackling the definition of 
Internet freedom, established several components of “good policy for 
Internet governance and practice” that advanced the ball toward a 
more codified recognition of some widely accepted sub-principles of 
Internet freedom, endorsed by all thirty-four member countries.6 
These principles include crucial components, such as promoting and 
protecting the global free flow of information, fostering voluntarily 
developed codes of conduct, ensuring transparency, fair process and 
accountability, and limiting Internet intermediary liability.7 
 While the enthusiasm for multilateral principles has subsided, the 
actual work of defining and supporting Internet freedom at a more 
granular level has continued at the level of advocacy and scholarship, 
with civil society groups around the world increasingly orienting their 
work around a number of sub-issues, including intermediary liability, 
privacy, net neutrality, and surveillance. The Global Network 
Initiative, a corporate social responsibility initiative that counts 
4 Freedom of the Internet 2014, Freedom House, 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2014_Full_Report_compressedv2_0
.pdf (last visited June 17, 2015).  
5 For examples of such criticism, see Diego Giannone, Political and Ideological Aspects in 
the Measurement of Democracy: The Freedom House Case, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 68, 68-
69 (2010). See also Lisa Brooten, The Problem with Human Rights Discourse and 
Freedom Indices: The Case of Burma/Myanmar Media, 7 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
COMMUNICATION 681, 695 (2013). 
6 OECD Principles for Internet Policy Making, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd-principles-for-internet-policy-making.pdf (last 
visited June 5, 2015). 
7 Id. 
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Google and Yahoo among its founding members, defines its mission as 
“protecting and advancing freedom of expression and privacy in 
information and communications technologies,” encouraging 
companies to hew to jointly developed principles on freedom of 
expression, privacy, multi-stakeholder collaboration, and responsible 
company decision making.8 The Center for Internet and Society in 
India focuses on, inter alia, accessibility, access to knowledge, and 
“openness,” under which they include open government data, open 
access, and open education resources.9 
 It is because of this profusion of concerns, some in tension with 
others, that the use of the phrase “Internet freedom” in policy rhetoric 
seems increasingly anachronistic, not to mention out of touch with a 
burgeoning and skeptical population of Internet users. 
GLOBAL CONTEXT: A DECLINING ENVIRONMENT 
 The current global context for governance of the Internet is in flux. 
Developing countries are no longer content to let others lead the 
conversation about what the future of the Internet will look like, not 
least because their citizens will make up the majority of users for the 
foreseeable future. Ongoing, multifaceted conversations are taking 
place about national sovereignty, the role of the private sector, 
security, privacy, and the concept of universal digital rights for 
Internet users. Increasingly, the catchall phrase of “Internet freedom” 
does not do justice to the current complexity. 
 In addition, these conversations now take place in the wake of the 
Snowden revelations and, thus, against a backdrop of pervasive, deep-
seated mistrust of the surveillance policies enacted by the U.S. and 
other industrialized democracies. On the positive side, this has 
catalyzed debate about the limits of national and international 
surveillance and ways to enact appropriate oversight and 
transparency. At the same time, many countries resent perceived 
lecturing by the U.S. about “Internet freedom,” while simultaneously 
being watched by its intelligence agencies. This, in turn, weakens the 
effectiveness of the U.S. in making the case for the sub-components of 
Internet freedom in the international arena. 
8 Principles, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, 
http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php (last visited June 19, 2015).  
9 Openness, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, http://cis-india.org/openness (last 
visited June 19, 2015).  
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 This is unfortunate because that case needs to be made. Freedom 
House’s latest report shows that thirty-six out of sixty-five countries 
assessed in the report experienced a negative trajectory during the 
coverage period.21 Legal measures at the national level are 
increasingly being used to stifle online expression: Freedom House 
emphasizes that between May of 2013 and May of 2014, forty-one 
countries passed or proposed legislation to penalize legitimate forms 
of online speech, increase government powers to control content, or 
expand government surveillance capabilities.22 In many cases, civil 
society in these countries lacks the capacity to advocate effectively, 
and absent international pressure to the contrary, there is likely to be 
little pushback against such measures. 
GETTING SPECIFIC 
 Does the phrase “Internet freedom” still have utility?  Sure. As 
Internet observer and optimist Cory Doctorow notes, phrasing things 
in stark terms can help focus discussion.  So-called Internet utopians 
“create a normative discussion about the dangers of an ‘evil’ internet 
and the power of a good one, in Silicon Valley and its many global 
offshoots.”12 He goes on to note that this is necessary but insufficient: 
“That’s why [Internet utopians] campaign for legal reform; that’s why 
they liberate data; that’s why they form mass movements to stop the 
drive to kill net neutrality or impose mass surveillance.”13 
 To be sure, ditching a phrase or two does not necessarily lead to 
practical policy solutions. Evgeny Morozov, an extreme critic of 
techno-utopianism, has advocated against using even the phrase “the 
Internet,” much less “Internet freedom.”14 Such suggestions are 
impractical in everyday life, much less policy advocacy.15 This essay 
10 Freedom of the Internet 2014, supra note 4.  
11 Id. 
12 Cory Doctorow, The Internet is the Answer to All the Questions of Our Time, THE 




14 EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE (1st ed. 2013).  
15 Tim Wu, Book Review: To Save Everything, Click Here, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-to-save-everything-click-here-by-
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stops short of calling for extremely precise definitions in everyday 
speech and writing; if one wants to initiate an actual conversation as 
opposed to a long negotiation over terms, then some degree of 
fuzziness is necessary and inevitable. 
 That being said, it appears the term “Internet freedom” has 
convinced some U.S. policymakers that they can champion digital 
rights, while avoiding the specifics. Adopting this position, however, 
does not shield the U.S. from criticism regarding surveillance and 
other policies; it merely hamstrings the ability to have a coherent 
discussion about the very real tradeoffs and complexities inherent in 
defining Internet freedom—even in the United States.  
 The fact is that all democratic governments, and even some 
authoritarian governments, struggle with how much they can and will 
control, and also monitor or shape Internet communications.  
Addressing those complexities head on and wrestling with the, 
sometimes, competing demands of security and liberty lies at the 
heart of democracy. This is a global conversation the U.S. should lead, 
rather than avoid.  
 By doing this, the U.S. can begin to restore its credibility and 
legitimacy on these issues. Why does this matter? It matters because 
the ambitions embodied in the concept of Internet freedom are indeed 
important to ensuring the preservation of an open, globally accessible 
Internet that can serve as a cornerstone of economic development and 
free expression. The U.S. is uniquely positioned to maintain focus and 
bring constructive pressure to bear on these issues.   
 The U.S. can, for example, include specific measures to boost civil 
society advocacy capacity on these issues in those countries where 
civil society is weak and online speech is threatened. It does not need 
to stop there: Since so much international assistance is government-
focused, the U.S. can also use its influence among international 
donors to make sure that capacity building for governments on issues 
relating to Internet policy are weighted and funded accordingly, rather 
than being treated as an afterthought. These types of commitments, 
embedded and normed within traditional development assistance, will 
help create an enabling environment at the national level within 
developing countries where Internet use is growing the fastest. Such 
commitments will go farther than small-scale funds distributed to 
anti-censorship or other technological solutions to attempt to allow 
civil society and dissidents to communicate. These latter efforts 
should not go away—because they also serve a useful purpose—but 
evgeny-morozov/2013/04/12/0e82400a-9ac9-11e2-9a79-eb5280c81c63_story.html (last 
visited June 22, 2015).  
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they should exist alongside a much broader and deeper international 
assistance framework. Only through such comprehensive efforts can 
Internet freedom, in all its many dimensions, flourish on a global 
scale. 
